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ABSTRACT 
  The Alaska Constitution grants its citizens the right to ballot initiatives, 
but the right is limited: initiatives may not “make or repeal appropriations.” 
To determine whether a proposed initiative is an appropriation, Alaska courts 
use a two-step test that determines, first, whether an initiative deals with a 
state asset and, second, whether the initiative involves a giveaway or would 
strip the legislature of its control over state assets. This test is incomplete, 
however, because it does not properly consider Article XI, sections 4 and 6 of 
the Alaska Constitution, which give the legislature a strong check on the 
initiative process. The Author proposes a test that would limit the finding of 
giveaways to situations in which the voters themselves materially benefit 
from an initiative. The test would hold an initiative unconstitutional when it 
permanently robs the legislature of its discretion over state assets. The Author 
then applies this new test in a case study utilizing the recent Clean Water 
Initiatives. 
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On August 26, 2008, Alaska voters went to the polls and rejected 
Ballot Measure 4, known as the Clean Water Initiative, by a resounding 
margin. The vote marked the end of an intense legal and political 
struggle that began more than a year earlier and has resulted in at least a 
temporary victory for supporters of Pebble Mine. This vote has been so 
well-publicized both in Alaska and on a national level1 that, at first 
glance, there appears to be little left to discuss. However, the saga of the 
Clean Water Initiative confronted issues that transcend Pebble Mine and 
 
 1. See, e.g.,  William Yardley, Vote in Alaska Puts Question: Gold or Fish?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2008; Elizabeth Bluemink, Pebble Blog, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, http://community.adn.com/adn/blog/61223 (last visited Mar. 28, 2009) 
(chronicling ADN’s Pebble coverage). 
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strike at the very heart of the right of Alaskans to sponsor and pursue 
ballot initiatives. In the aftermath of this struggle, it is important to focus 
on the principles at stake and not merely on the outcome. 
Although ballot initiatives are enshrined in the Alaska 
Constitution, citizens are explicitly prohibited from using the ballot 
initiative to make appropriations.2 Though the meaning of 
“appropriation” is not defined by the constitution, the Alaska Supreme 
Court has developed an approach to the term that has increasingly 
restricted the right. Relying on these decisions, the Alaska Attorney 
General rejected two earlier anti-Pebble initiatives before certifying the 
third attempt. The litigation that followed appeared to set the stage for 
the next major decision by the supreme court regarding the contours of 
the appropriation prohibition. However, shortly before oral argument, 
the sponsors withdrew the first attempted initiative (Clean Water I) 
from consideration, leaving the court with the decision of affirming the 
relatively uncontroversial decision on the third initiative (Clean Water 
III). One possibility for the withdrawal of Clean Water I was that 
supporters thought the court would strike down Clean Water I, thereby 
hurting Clean Water III’s chances. If so, this concern was well-founded 
since, under the current test employed by the supreme court, it is likely 
that Clean Water I would be an appropriation. 
However, focusing too much on what would happen under the 
current test obscures the real issue: does that test reflect a correct 
interpretation of the appropriation prohibition? This Note will argue 
that the current test does not fully take into account the relationship 
between the initiative process and the legislature that was envisioned by 
the text of the Alaska Constitution and the expressed intent of the 
framers. Part I will provide a brief background on Alaskan ballot 
initiative law. Part II will summarize the controversy over Pebble Mine 
and the Clean Water Initiatives. Part III will turn to the development of 
the doctrine regarding appropriations, and Part IV will identify key 
constitutional issues overlooked by the current test. Part V will apply 
these concepts to the current test and, in the process, develop an 
alternative test that better reflects the text and purpose of the 
constitution. Finally, Part VI will display the differences between the 
current and proposed tests by applying them to Clean Water I. 
 
 2. See ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
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I.  BACKGROUND: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE IN ALASKA 
The citizen’s right to ballot initiatives is found in article XI, section 
1 of the Alaska Constitution.3 Alaskans have taken advantage of this 
right throughout their history and have passed initiatives on a wide 
range of issues, including hunting and fishing, English as the state’s 
official language, and medical marijuana.4 Section 7 prohibits initiatives 
that make appropriations, dedicate revenues, create or define the 
jurisdiction of the courts, prescribe the rules of the courts, or enact local 
or special legislation.5 The legislature is heavily involved in the process 
and has the power to preempt an initiative by passing a substantially 
similar law before the initiative is voted on.6 It may also repeal any 
initiative after two years, or amend it at any time.7 
The initiative process begins with an application to the Lieutenant 
Governor,8 who, within sixty days, will either certify the initiative or 
announce the grounds for its denial, which are limited to problems of 
form or constitutionality—particularly whether it violates the Section 7 
prohibitions.9 If denied, the only recourse is to redraft the initiative in 
compliance with the Lieutenant Governor’s request or challenge the 
denial through the courts.10 
If certified, the sponsors prepare a petition to circulate throughout 
the state.11 Within one year of certification the petition must include 
signatures from a number of voters equal to at least 10% of those who 
voted in the preceding general election, including 7% of voters in at least 
three-fourths of the state house districts who voted in the preceding 
elections.12 If the petition drive is successful and certified by the 
 
 3. ALASKA CONST. art. XI § 1. 
 4. See Alaska Division of Elections, Initiatives That Have Been on Alaska’s 
Ballots, http://ltgov.state.ak.us/elections/initbal.php (last visited Mar. 28, 
2009). 
 5. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
 6. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.210 (2008). 
 7. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6. 
 8. The application includes the proposed bill, the bill’s title, and the 
signature of 100 voters as sponsors, three of whom are designated as the 
initiative committee. ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.45.030–.040 (2008). 
 9. ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.45.070–.080 (2008). 
 10. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 2. 
 11. The petition must contain, among other things, the proposed bill, an 
impartial summary of the bill, the estimated cost of the bill, and a statement of 
warning that knowingly signing the same bill more than once is a misdemeanor. 
ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.45.090–.100 (2008). The petition’s circulator must be an 
Alaska resident and may not be paid more than one dollar per signature, nor 
may any voter be paid to either sign or refrain from signing a petition. ALASKA 
STAT. §§ 15.45.105–.110 (2008). 
 12. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.140 (2008). 
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Lieutenant Governor, the initiative will be placed on the ballot of the 
first statewide election held after filing and 120 days after the 
adjournment of the previous legislative session.13 A successful initiative 
becomes effective within 90 days of the election.14 
II.  THE BATTLE OVER THE CLEAN WATER INITIATIVES 
Although the Clean Water Initiatives and Pebble Mine have 
received wide attention, they are worth discussing here to serve as a 
refresher and to highlight some of the legal background that has not 
garnered as much media attention. 
A. Background on Pebble Mine 
The history of Pebble Mine began in 1986 when Cominco, a major 
mining corporation, first began exploration of the area that would 
become known as Pebble Mine, leading to the discovery of the Pebble 
West deposit in 1988.15 By 1992, however, Cominco had essentially 
abandoned the project, and in 2001, its option to the area was acquired 
by Northern Dynasty Mining (NDM).16 Subsequently, on July 31, 2007, 
NDM joined with Anglo American17 to form Pebble Partnership, a fifty-
fifty partnership to develop Pebble Mine.18 The other companies with 
interest in Pebble Partnership are Rio Tinto, which currently owns 
 
 13. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.190 (2008). 
 14. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.220 (2008). 
 15. See N. Dynasty Minerals Ltd., The Pebble Project: The Future of U.S. 
Mining & Metals, http://www.northerndynastyminerals.com/ndm/Pebble.asp 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2009). 
 16. Id. NDM is a mining company based out of Vancouver, Canada and is a 
part of the Hunter Dickinson group of companies, a larger organization that 
deals with various natural resource development projects. See N. Dynasty 
Minerals, Ltd., Corporate Profile, http://www.northerndynasty.com/ndm/ 
CorporateProfile.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2009). NDM appears to exist solely for 
the development of Pebble Mine. See id. 
 17. Anglo American, based in London, England, is one of the largest mining 
companies in the world, with annual gross revenues of $35.7 billion and over 
190,000 employees worldwide. See Anglo American, About Us: At a Glance, 
http://www.angloamerican.co.uk/aa/about/ataglance/ (last visited Mar. 28, 
2009). 
 18. See Pebble Partnership, Overview and History, http:// 
www.pebblepartnership.com/pages/project-information/project-overview.php 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2009). 
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nearly 20% percent of NDM,19 and Mitsubishi, which acquired a 9.1% 
stake in NDM on February 16, 2008.20 
In early 2005, NDM claimed that Pebble West contained 4.1 billion 
tons of resources, including 42.1 million ounces of gold, 24.6 billion 
pounds of copper, and 1.4 billion tons of molybdenum and additional 
silver.21 In September of that year, NDM announced the discovery of 
Pebble East, which was, at the time, believed to contain an additional 
42.6 billion pounds of copper, 39.6 million ounces of gold and 2.7 billion 
pounds of molybdenum.22 According to NDM, the combined haul from 
these two sites would make Pebble Mine the second largest copper 
porphyry mine in the world, just behind a mine in Indonesia.23 
Shortly thereafter, NDM began the permitting process by applying 
to the Alaska Department of Natural Resources.24  Although the exact 
details of the project have not been released, Pebble Partnership 
currently claims that the mine will create two thousand jobs for two to 
three years during the construction phase and one thousand high-skill 
jobs during an expected fifty- to eighty-year operation period.25 
Additionally, the Partnership claims that the mine will lead to hundreds 
of millions of dollars in annual state and local tax revenue, as well as 
capital expenditures of three to four billion dollars.26 The mine will also 
require a considerable amount of infrastructure, including hundreds of 
miles of roads and pipelines and at least two large dams.27 
 
 19. See Pebble Partnership, Company Overview, http:// 
www.pebblepartnership.com/pages/about-the-pebble-partnership/company-
overview.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2009). 
 20. See Mitsubishi Becomes Stakeholder in Pebble, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 
16, 2008, available at http://www.adn.com/money/industries/mining/ 
story/316778.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2009). 
 21. See Pebble Partnership, Overview and History, supra note 18. 
 22. Mary Pemberton, Pebble Mine Prospect Keeps Getting Richer, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 13, 2007, available at http://dwb.adn.com/money/ 
industries/mining/pebble/story/9376024p-9289321c.html (last visited Mar. 28, 
2009). 
 23. See id. 
 24. See Pebble Partnership, Regulatory Review, http://www. 
pebblepartnership.com/pages/project-information/regulatory-review.php (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2009). 
 25. See Pebble Partnership, Jobs and Business Opportunities: Overview, 
http://pebblepartnership.com/pages/jobs-business-opportunities/ 
opportunities.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2009). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Pebble Partnership, Road, Port & Power, http:// 
pebblepartnership.com/pages/project-information/road-port-power.php (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2009) (providing details on roads and pipelines). 
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B. Opposition to Pebble Mine 
Organized opposition to Pebble Mine began to develop in 2005 and 
included the Renewable Resources Coalition (RRC), a group formed in 
June 2005 in part to thwart the development of Pebble Mine.28 
Opponents of the mine have typically focused their attacks on the 
potential harm the mine may cause to the salmon population of the 
Bristol Bay drainage.29 Bristol Bay is home to one of the world’s largest 
salmon populations and the largest population of sockeye salmon.30 
Commercial fishing in the area produces millions of dollars in revenue 
for Alaska fishermen.31 The great fear of the salmon fishers is that, due 
to Pebble Mine’s location on the headwaters of the Kvichak and 
Nushagak rivers, the mine will poison the water, release various toxins, 
and irreparably damage the Bristol Bay fishery.32 
The Alaska legislature also began to respond. First, on January 26, 
2007, Senate Bill 67 was put forward by Sen. Gary Stevens of Kodiak.33 If 
passed, Senate Bill 67 would designate a significant portion of Pebble 
Mine to be the Jay Hammond State Park, effectively ending the 
development of the mine, but without affecting any other mining 
prospects in the state.34 However, this bill has never left committee, and 
there has been no other recent activity, suggesting that the legislature, if 
it decides to act, will not do so via Senate Bill 67.35 House Bill 134 was 
introduced by Bryce Edgmon of Dillingham on February 14, 2007 and 
would, if enacted, prohibit certain conduct with water and greatly limit 
the potential development of Pebble Mine.36 This bill, like its Senate 
counterpart, has also languished in committee, but may have received 
new life on February 27, 2008, when a modified version of the bill was 
 
 28. See Renewable Resources Coalition, About Us, http://www. 
renewableresourcescoalition.org/about_us.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2009). 
 29. See, e.g., Geoffrey Parker et al., Pebble Mine: Fish, Minerals, And Testing the 
Limits of Alaska’s “Large Mine Permitting Process,” 25 ALR 1 (2008), 17–21 (arguing 
that Pebble Mine would likely have negative effects on Bristol Bay salmon 
population). 
 30. Id. at 7. 
 31. See id. at 6–9 (describing the Bristol Bay fishing economy). 
 32. See id. at 17–21. 
 33. See Alaska Senate Bipartisan Working Group, Available Data for SB67, 
http://www.aksenate.org/index.php?bill=SB.067 (last visited Mar. 12, 2009). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See Margaret Bauman, Pebble Backers Say Fish Refuge Bill Actually Targets 
Mine, ALASKA J. COM., Feb. 25, 2007, available at http://www.alaskajournal 
.com/stories/022507/hom_20070225034.shtml. 
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approved by the House Special Committee on Fisheries and sent to the 
House Resources Committee.37  
C. The Initiatives 
The struggle over the Clean Water Initiatives began when 
opponents of Pebble Mine attempted to certify the first Clean Water 
Initiative (“Clean Water I”), on April 25, 2007.38 This initiative sets out 
five broad prohibitions and restrictions that relate to large-scale mining. 
First, mines are prohibited from releasing “any toxic pollutant”39 into 
water that is used by either humans or salmon.40 Second, specific 
substances including cyanide and sulfuric acid are prohibited from 
being used in watersheds that could lead to direct, indirect, or 
cumulative harm to either humans or salmon.41 Third, the initiative 
prohibits the storage or disposal of metallic mineral wastes and tailings 
that generate sulfuric acid or dissolved metals.42 Fourth, the storage or 
disposal of metallic mineral wastes and tailings is prohibited within one 
thousand feet of any body of water used by humans for drinking or by 
salmon. Fifth, any activity that causes acid mine drainage is also 
prohibited.43 Finally, the initiative makes clear that it only applies to 
new mines and does not affect pre-existing large-scale mines.44 The 
Alaska Attorney General’s office rejected this initiative because it was 
found to be an appropriation, particularly the first prohibition, because 
it would likely preclude mining operations and would therefore 
interfere with the legislature’s “power to allocate resources amongst 
competing uses.”45 In doing so, the Attorney General rejected the 
contention of the initiative’s sponsors that it merely contained additional 
 
 37. See Alaska’s House Democratic Caucus, HB 134, http:// 
www.akdemocrats.org/index.php?bill=HB134#data, (last visited Mar. 12, 2009) 
(providing information on bill including current status). 
 38. See Review of 07WATR Initiative Application, Office of the Attorney 
General of Alaska, 2007 Alas. AG LEXIS 10, *1 (Alaska June 21, 2007). 
 39. This is broadly defined to include any substance that causes “death, 
disease, malignancy, behavioral abnormalities, or malfunctions in growth, 
development, behavior or reproduction, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological 
malfunctions or physical or physiological abnormalities.” Id. at *2. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at *3. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at *3–4. 
 45. Id. at *32. 
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regulations.46 This decision was challenged by the sponsors and was the 
primary subject of both superior court opinions discussed below.47 
A second Clean Water Initiative, Clean Water II, was sent to the 
Lieutenant Governor on July 30, 2007 as an attempt to eliminate the 
concerns over appropriations.48 This initiative was also rejected by the 
Alaska Attorney General as being an appropriation.49 The differences 
between this initiative and Clean Water I appear to be related more to 
form than substance. The five prohibitions were cast as three standards 
that could not be infringed by any activity associated with a large-scale 
mining operation.50 The Attorney General rejected this initiative because 
it was found to be beyond mere regulations and was actually an 
allocation of water.51 The sponsors have not challenged this decision and 
Clean Water II is no longer relevant to the struggle over Pebble Mine. 
Finally, a third Clean Water Initiative (“Clean Water III”) was sent 
to the Lieutenant Governor on October 9, 2007.52 This time, the Attorney 
General certified the initiative.53 The Clean Water III initiative describes 
itself as “regulatory standards affecting streams and waters” and 
requires large-scale mines to comply with two standards.54 The Attorney 
General certified Clean Water III because the initiative only prohibited 
the discharge of waste and pollutants that are harmful, rather than 
prohibiting the discharge of all waste or pollutants.55 This decision was 
challenged by proponents of Pebble Mine.56  
 
 46. Id. at *28. 
 47. See infra Part II.D. 
 48. See Review of 07WTR2 Initiative Application, Office of the Attorney 
General of Alaska, 2007 Alas. AG LEXIS 25 (Alaska Sept. 27, 2007). 
 49. Id. at *1–2. 
 50. Id. at *2–3. These standards are: first, toxic pollutants may not be issued 
into water “that will effect [sic] human health or welfare or any stage of the life 
cycle of salmon”; second, cyanide or sulfuric acid may not be released into any 
watershed used by humans or salmon; third, metallic mineral wastes and 
tailings may not be stored or disposed in a way that could release sulfuric acid 
or other harmful agents into water used by humans or salmon. Id. at *4–5. 
 51. Id. at *28. 
 52. See Review of 07WTR3 Initiative Application, Office of the Attorney 
General of Alaska, 2007 Alas. AG LEXIS 26 (Alaska Oct. 17, 2007). 
 53. Id. at *28–30. 
 54. Id. at *1. These standards are: first, the release of any toxic pollutant “in a 
measurable amount that will effect [sic] human health or welfare or any stage of 
the life cycle of salmon” into water is prohibited; second, the storage or disposal 
of mining wastes or tailings that could release sulfuric acid or other toxic 
pollutants that will affect water used by humans or salmon is also prohibited. Id. 
at *4–5. 
 55. Id. at *28–30. 
 56. See infra Part II.D. 
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D. The Conflicting Superior Court Opinions 
Following the Attorney General’s decisions, there were two 
superior court opinions concerning Clean Water I that went in 
completely opposite directions. 
The first opinion57 was issued by Judge Fred Torrissi of the Third 
Judicial District at Dillingham on October 12, 2007. The court held that 
the initiative was not an appropriation and characterized the parties as 
differing “by only one part per billion, or less,”58 due to the State’s 
admission at oral argument that if miners could release less than one 
part per billion of arsenic as opposed to none, the initiative “sounded 
like a regulation.”59 The court found that, if passed, the initiative would 
ban all new large-scale mining for the foreseeable future.60 The court 
struggled with the question of whether Clean Water I was an 
appropriation, admitting that, “[t]he answer does not leap out at us.”61 
After deeply analyzing the supreme court jurisprudence discussed in 
detail below, the court concluded that the initiative was not an 
unconstitutional appropriation because Clean Water I did not designate 
property for a particular use, but rather prohibited property from one 
particular use and thus did not “bind the legislature’s hands or require 
disposition of state property.”62 
The second opinion63 was issued by Judge Douglas Blankenship of 
the Fourth Judicial District at Fairbanks on February 28, 2008. In contrast 
with the Dillingham opinion, the court held that Clean Water I was an 
unconstitutional appropriation.64 The court began by assuming that 
since Clean Water I prohibited the release of “any pollutant 
whatsoever,” the initiative would have effectively banned large-scale 
mining for the foreseeable future.65 After reviewing the case law, the 
court held that the initiative “reduces the government’s discretion over 
allocation of water use and appeals to the self-interest of users of salmon 
 
 57. Holman v. Parnell, No. 3DI-07-56 (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2007), 
available at http://www.ltgov.state.ak.us/PDFs/07WATR-SummaryJudgment. 
pdf. 
 58. Id. at 2. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 7. 
 61. Id. at 10. 
 62. Id. at 16–17. The court also dismissed a separation of powers claim by the 
state because “the people aren’t a branch of government, and we don’t construe 
the constitution to protect us from ourselves.” Id. at 17. 
 63. Council of Alaska Producers v. Parnell, No. 4FA-07-2696 (Alaska Super. 
Ct. Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://www.ltgov.state.ak.us/PDFs/07WATR-
FairbanksSuperiorCourt.PDF. 
 64. Id. at 2. 
 65. Id. at 13. 
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and people currently using drinking water.”66 The initiative, therefore, 
“essentially attempts to appropriate water only to human drinking 
water and salmon.”67 In the view of this court, the legislature must be 
able to “retain discretion to allocate public assets such as water to all 
uses.”68  
E. The Supreme Court Litigation and the Vote 
Following the conflicting superior court opinions, both sides 
appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, which heard oral arguments in 
the case on June 18, 2008. Before oral arguments, however, the sponsors 
decided to withdraw Clean Water I,69 and the court was left with only 
the issue of whether Clean Water III was an unconstitutional 
appropriation. On July 3, 2008, the supreme court released an order that 
upheld the constitutionality of Clean Water III.70 The order is a brief 
three pages and neither lists its author nor mentions if any justices 
dissented.71 Nevertheless, the order makes clear the validity of Clean 
Water III and affirms the relevant part of the Fairbanks opinion; a full 
opinion is expected in the future.72 Following the order, Clean Water III 
was placed on the ballot.73 
Finally, Clean Water III, now called Ballot Measure 4, was 
considered in the August 26, 2008, primary and was soundly defeated, 
with roughly fifty-eight percent of voters opposing the initiative.74 
Supporters of the initiative blamed the defeat on the massive amount of 
money spent by pro-mining groups, as well as the influence of Governor 
Sarah Palin’s public announcement that she would vote “No.”75 
 
 66. Id. at 19. 
 67. Id. at 20. 
 68. Id. The court further held that Clean Water III was not an appropriation 
because it only prohibited discharge that would have had an adverse impact, 
and therefore allowed large-scale mines to operate if they did so cleanly. See id. 
at 21. Moreover, Clean Water III did not set aside any state assets and left it to 
the legislature to determine the meaning of “adverse.” See id. at 23. 
 69. See Elizabeth Bluemink, Court Dismisses Anti-Pebble Initiative, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, June 9, 2008, available at http://community.adn.com/adn/ 
node/124949. 
 70. See Pebble Ltd. P’ship v. Parnell, 187 P.3d 478 (Alaska 2008). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See Mary Pemberton, Alaska Voters Decide Mining Over Fish, AP, Aug. 27, 
2008, available at http://www.newsvine.com/_news/2008/08/27/1791232-
alaska-voters-decide-mining-over-fish. 
 75. See Mary Pemberton, Measure 4 Supporters Regroup, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Aug. 28, 2008, at A3. 
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However, initiative opponents countered that the lack of clarity about 
the initiative was a major reason for its defeat.76 
III. THE LEGAL EVOLUTION OF THE APPROPRIATION 
PROHIBITION 
The Alaska constitution provides that “[t]he people may propose 
and enact laws by the initiative;”77 however, the initiative may not be 
used to, among other things, “make or repeal appropriations.”78 The 
current test to determine whether an initiative is an appropriation is a 
two-step inquiry. First, an initiative must deal with a state asset.79 
Second, if an initiative does deal with a state asset,80 the court 
determines whether it is an appropriation.81 To perform the second step, 
the court considers whether an initiative clashes with either of the two 
primary purposes of the restriction: preventing giveaways of state assets 
and retaining the legislature’s discretion regarding the disposition of 
state assets among competing uses.82  
This test appears nowhere in the state constitution nor was it 
proposed by any of the framers. Rather, the current test was crafted by 
the Alaska Supreme Court through a series of significant decisions. 
Initially, the prohibition was arguably only implicated in initiatives that 
concerned the appropriation of state money. However, the court 
dispensed with that view in Bailey v. Warren, a 1979 decision holding 
that an appropriation occurred when there was a giveaway of state-
owned land.83 This decision was extended in 1987 to include giveaways 
of all other state assets in Alaska Conservative Political Action Committee 
(“ACPAC”) v. Municipality of Anchorage.84 The second purpose of the test 
was added in McAlpine v. University of Alaska,85 a 1988 decision in which 
the court first held that an appropriation would be found when an 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 78. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
 79. See, e.g., Alaska Conservative Political Action Comm. v. Municipality of 
Anchorage, 745 P.2d 936, 938 (Alaska 1987). 
 80.Courts had typically interpreted the term “state asset” quite broadly. See 
Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of Anchorage, 151 P.3d 418, 
422–23 (Alaska 2007) (explaining that public revenue, land, municipally owned 
utilities, and wild salmon were all found to be state assets); but see id. at 424 
(holding that taxi permits were not state assets). 
 81. Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform, 151 P.3d at 423. 
 82. See, e.g., id. 
 83. See Bailey v. Warren, 595 P.2d 1, 7–8 (Alaska 1979). 
 84. 745 P.2d at 938. 
 85. 762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988). 
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initiative interfered with the legislature’s discretion86 by “set[ting] aside 
a certain specified amount of money or property for a specific purpose 
or object in such manner that is executable, mandatory, and reasonably 
definite with no further discretion.”87 
The test, therefore, was formalized by the late 1980s. Two major 
developments subsequent to McAlpine have resulted in a considerably 
broader interpretation of the prohibition than had previously existed, 
without adding any new factors. The first of these developments was the 
1996 decision in Pullen v. Ulmer, in which the court seemed to stretch to 
find an appropriation in an initiative that, on its face, was not 
necessarily one. Although this decision is arguably correct, it should, in 
the very least, be viewed as the outermost boundary of the prohibition. 
The court’s decision in Alaska Action Center, the second development, 
was inappropriate because the initiative at issue did not truly rob the 
legislature of its discretion over the state asset.88 
These two decisions have created a regime where the power of the 
initiative to pass important legislation may be curtailed. At a certain 
level, it seems reasonable to imagine that any initiative could interfere 
with legislative discretion. To a certain extent, that is the point of the 
right to the ballot initiative Alaska has conferred on its citizens; without 
it, the legislature would be the only body able to make laws. 
The court, therefore, must seek a proper balance of the right89 and 
the restriction,90 while giving full effect to both. Additionally, the court 
must also take into account article XI, sections 491 and 692 of the Alaska 
Constitution. These two provisions create a complicated interaction 
between citizens and the legislature that makes clear the shortcomings 
of the current test and has, unfortunately, been ignored by the supreme 
court. 
The following sections elaborate on the evolution of the doctrine 
and discuss the pivotal decisions in greater detail. 
 
 86. See id. at 88. 
 87. City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Convention and Visitors Bureau, 818 P.2d 
1153, 1157 (Alaska 1991) (reaffirming rule in McAlpine). 
 88. See Alaska Action Center, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 84 P.3d 989, 
994 (Alaska 2007). 
 89. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 90. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
 91. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 4 (providing the legislature with the power to 
eliminate a pending initiative if it passes a substantially similar piece of 
legislation before the initiative is voted on). 
 92. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6 (providing the legislature with the authority to 
overturn an initiative two years after enactment and amend the passed initiative 
at any time). 
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A. Bailey and ACPAC: Beyond Money 
The supreme court first expanded the definition of appropriation to 
include situations beyond the appropriation of money in Bailey v. 
Warren.93 The initiative at issue was the Alaska Homestead Act, which 
would have made available a total of thirty million acres of state lands to 
residents who fulfilled several minimal requirements.94 In interpreting 
the constitution, the court explained that the issue should be interpreted 
based on the “the language of section 7 construed in light of the purpose 
of the provision.”95 
The court held that “appropriations” was an ambiguous term and 
could mean state assets beyond money.96 Next, looking to the purposes 
behind the enactment of the provision to determine if the initiative at 
issue was an appropriation, the court held that “[t]he delegates wanted 
to prohibit the initiative process from being used to enact give-away 
programs, which have an inherent popular appeal, that would endanger 
the state treasury.”97 This holding was based on the framers’ general 
concern about abusing the initiative process and specific concerns 
regarding initiatives that dealt with appropriations.98 The general 
concern was expressed in several ways; for example, the framers 
reduced the time an initiative could not be repealed from three years to 
two and allowed for the initiative to be amended by the legislature at 
any time.99 Also, the restrictions were seen as a “compromise designed 
to reserve basic authorities to the people while protecting the state 
 
 93. 595 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1979). 
 94. See id. at 2 (including such requirements as filing an application, showing 
proof of residency, and paying a one hundred dollar filing fee). 
 95. Id. at 4. The court further elaborated on its constitutional theory and 
explained that it was “especially sensitive to the policy concerns embodied in 
constitutional provisions because a constitution is a document unchangeable by 
ordinary means” that “must be considered as a living document adaptable to 
changing conditions and circumstances unanticipated at the time it was 
written.” See id. (internal citations omitted). 
 96. Id. at 6–7. In doing so, the court also addressed a somewhat strange event 
in the legislative history. An earlier draft of the provision had proposed to 
include the phrase “of public funds” after “appropriations;” however, it was 
defeated, partly because the constitution’s framers deemed it to be unnecessary. 
See id. at 6–7. The court dismissed any possible argument that this would limit 
appropriations to money by explaining that, since “public funds” was just as 
ambiguous as “appropriations,” there was no need to revisit its earlier holding. 
See id. at 7. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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against rash, discriminatory, and irresponsible acts.”100 Initiatives 
dealing with appropriations were viewed as especially susceptible to 
“rash, discriminatory, and irresponsible acts,” and the restriction was 
adopted in part to curtail the bad experiences of states without a similar 
restriction.101 This concern was particularly strong regarding a giveaway 
that “tempt[s] the voter to [prefer] . . . his immediate financial welfare at 
the expense of vital government activities.”102 Accordingly, a massive 
giveaway of land is an appropriation just as much as a massive 
giveaway of money, since both rob the state of major assets and present 
the voters with the same type of temptation.103 
The supreme court expanded appropriations to cover all state 
assets in Alaska Conservative Political Action Committee v. Municipality of 
Anchorage.104 There, the initiative required Anchorage to sell its 
municipally–owned power company for one dollar.105 This constituted 
an appropriation because it was exactly the type of “rash, 
discriminatory, and irresponsible act” the prohibition was intended to 
limit.106 However, the court failed to address the fact that, though 
perhaps rash and a bad policy decision, the individuals who voted for 
this initiative would not materially benefit from the initiative as they 
would have in Bailey. 
Bailey and its extension in ACPAC have served as the bedrock for 
all subsequent decisions.107 Bailey also contains a detailed look at the 
 
 100. Id. (quoting VICTOR FISCHER, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 80–
81 (1975)). 
 101. Id. For example, the court quoted one delegate who explained that 
without a restriction on appropriations, organized interest groups would create 
initiatives that took the power of “making of revenue measures and expenditure 
of the funds away from the legislature,” which could possibly bankrupt the 
state. See id. at 7–8 (further describing initiatives that did serious harm to 
California, Colorado, and Washington). 
 102. Id. at 8. 
 103. Id. at 9. This decision, however, was not unanimous. First, Justices 
Rabinowitz and Matthews concurred in the judgment and holding on 
appropriations, but would have invalidated the initiative based on its violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Alaska Constitution because the initiative 
would have infringed on individuals’ rights to travel and make their homes in 
Alaska. See id. at 9 (Rabinowitz, J., & Matthews, J., concurring). Justice Connor 
dissented and argued that the court should not have expanded the definition of 
appropriations beyond set-asides of money because, based on his reading of the 
constitutional history, that was the framers’ motivating concern. See id. at 19 
(Connor, J., dissenting). 
 104. 745 P.2d 936 (Alaska 1987). 
 105. Id. at 936. 
 106. Id. at 938. 
 107. See, e.g., Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 59 (Alaska 1996) (quoting Bailey, 
595 P.2d at 9). 
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intent of the framers to determine whether the initiative should be 
considered an appropriation.108 However, the court has not followed this 
lead, instead focusing exclusively on other supreme court decisions. 
Thus, in a sense, Bailey has become unmoored from its firm 
constitutional grounding and now stands solely for the proposition that 
a giveaway of a state asset is an appropriation. 
B. McAlpine: Beyond Giveaways 
Nine years after Bailey, the court in McAlpine v. University of 
Alaska109 first held that an initiative may not interfere with the 
legislature’s discretion over state assets.110 The initiative at issue dealt 
with an attempt to reorganize the administration of the state university 
and college system to create a separate community college system.111 
The second and third sentences of the initiative were of particular 
concern,112 and the supreme court held that only the third sentence was 
an appropriation.113 
In deciding to invalidate the third sentence, the court expanded the 
definition of “appropriation” to include “appropriations of state assets, 
regardless of whether the initiative would enact a give-away program or 
simply designate the use of the assets.”114 The court explained that, 
“[t]he reason for prohibiting appropriations by initiative is to ensure 
that the legislature, and only the legislature, retains control over the 
allocation of state assets among competing needs.”115 Under this 
definition, the third sentence was an unconstitutional appropriation 
because it “specifie[d] the amount of assets to be designated for 
community colleges . . . [and] no further legislative action would be 
 
 108. See Bailey, 595 P.2d at 68. 
 109. 762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988). 
 110. See id. at 91 (holding further that offending clauses could be severed from 
initiatives). 
 111. Id. In the past, the system was organized into five administrative units, 
with one unit specifically dealing with the community college system; however, 
the system was reorganized into three geographically-based units in December 
1986 and community colleges were administered based on locality. See id. at 82–
83. 
 112. These sentences read: “The University of Alaska shall transfer to the 
Community College of Alaska such real and personal property as is necessary to 
the independent operation and maintenance of the Community College System. 
The amount of property transferred shall be commensurate with that occupied 
and operated by the Community Colleges on November 1, 1986.” Id. at 83. 
 113. See id. at 89. 
 114. Id. at 89. 
 115. Id. at 88 (emphasis in original) (holding further that the initiative could 
still go to the voters because the unconstitutional third sentence could be 
severed from the constitutional second sentence). Id. at 93. 
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necessary to require the University to transfer . . . or to specify the 
amount of property the University must transfer.”116 In contrast, the 
second sentence was not an appropriation because, by not requiring a 
specific amount of resources, the legislature still had sufficient discretion 
regarding the funding of community colleges.117 
The rule in McAlpine was reaffirmed in City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks 
Convention and Visitors Bureau.118 Before the initiative, seventy percent of 
the bed tax revenue in Fairbanks went to the Convention and Visitors 
Bureau.119 The initiative aimed to remove this restriction and greatly 
expand the purposes for which the revenues could be used.120 The court 
explicitly stated that an appropriation exists if an initiative conflicts with 
the two purposes of the prohibition.121 In deciding whether the second 
purpose was implicated, the court explained that an initiative would be 
considered an appropriation when it “set aside a certain specified 
amount of money or property for a specific purpose or object in such 
manner that is executable, mandatory, and reasonably definite with no 
further discretion.”122 
Holding that the initiative was constitutional, the court refrained 
from invalidating it merely because it was “arguably an 
appropriation.”123 The court explained that “the purposes of the 
constitution are not met by construing the term ‘appropriations’ broadly 
in the context of an initiative which arguably repeals an 
appropriation.”124 Additionally, “[t]he purpose of the prohibition . . . is 
to ensure that the legislative body remains in control of and responsible 
for the budget”125 and that a broad interpretation of appropriation is not 
necessary in contexts that “[do] not disempower the legislative body 
from making annual spending decisions.”126 Although made in the 
context of an initiative alleged to have repealed an appropriation, these 
statements show that the court should always consider the purposes of 
the prohibition. 
 
 116. Id. at 91. 
 117. Id. The court further found that an offending clause could be severed 
from an initiative if the new form retains the primary purpose of the initiative 
and is still a law and not merely a broad policy statement. Id. at 95. 
 118. 818 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1991). 
 119. Id. at 1154. 
 120. Id. at 1155. 
 121. Id. at 1156 (quoting McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 88). 
 122. Id. at 1157. 
 123. Id. at 1156–57. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1157. 
 126. Id. 
MULLINS_FMT5.DOC 5/1/2009  4:25:27 PM 
152 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 26:1 
Over time, McAlpine has become the major case when considering 
whether an initiative is an appropriation because it is the first case 
where the dual purposes of the second step are stated, albeit indirectly. 
However, McAlpine does not contain the type of thorough constitutional 
analysis found in Bailey and begins the somewhat troubling reification of 
the doctrine that culminates with Alaska Action Center. 
C. Pullen: Stretching to Find an Appropriation 
The next major decision regarding appropriations was Pullen v. 
Ulmer.127 This case is important not because it provides an additional 
factor or step, but rather because the court appears to have stretched the 
test to find an appropriation. The challenged initiative provided that 
subsistence, personal use, and sport fisheries would receive preference 
in apportioning the salmon harvest before the remaining harvest would 
be available to other users.128 The portion was limited to five percent of 
the total statewide harvest, but that limit could be exceeded for any 
particular species or region.129 The Lieutenant Governor certified the 
initiative and the superior court held that the initiative was not an 
appropriation.130 
The supreme court disagreed and held that the initiative was an 
appropriation because it violated both purposes of the constitutional 
prohibition.131 First, the initiative was a giveaway because it appealed to 
the immediate self-interest of sport, personal, and subsistence fishers.132 
According to the court, this “tempt[s] the voter to [prefer] . . . his 
immediate financial welfare at the expense of vital government 
 
 127. 923 P.2d 54 (Alaska 1996). 
 128. Id. at 55. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 56–57. According to the superior court, the initiative merely created 
a “new system of preference among beneficial users of the statewide salmon 
harvest” that required further action by the Board of Fisheries to determine how 
much salmon each group was entitled to, thus preserving the Board’s “broad 
discretion” to make allocations. Id. at 57, n.7. 
 131. Id. at 63–64. Before discussing whether there was an appropriation, the 
court first held that salmon were a state asset even though “the state does not 
own wildlife in precisely the same way that it owns ordinary property.” Id. at 59. 
Rather, salmon, and wildlife in general, were state assets due to the benefit the 
state gained from wildlife in the form of increased tourism, business taxes, and 
hunting fees, and the constitutional importance of fish. Id. at 59–60. Public assets 
such as fish were deemed to be “held in trust for the benefit of all of the people 
of the state,” giving the state the authority to regulate and control their numbers. 
Id. at 60–61. 
 132. Id. at 61. 
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activities” in the same way as the massive land giveaway in Bailey.133 
The initiative also violated the prohibition’s second purpose since the 
initiative “significantly reduces the legislature’s and Board of Fisheries’ 
control of and discretion over allocation decisions, particularly in the 
event of stock-specific or region-specific shortages of salmon between 
the competing needs of users.”134 The court was primarily concerned 
about how the initiative would work during times of shortages and 
reasoned that the Fairness in Salmon Harvest (FISH) initiative could 
possibly result in the closure of some commercial fisheries.135 
Accordingly, the initiative called for an actual allocation of resources 
that removed a considerable amount of discretion from either the 
legislature or the Board.136 The court explained that this conclusion 
accorded with the principle expressed in McAlpine: that an 
appropriation exists if the initiative sets aside a specific amount of 
property for a specific purpose, by holding that the initiative would 
require the Board to adhere to the initiative and that legislative freedom 
is not retained in shortages.137 
D. Alaska Action Center: Crossing the Line 
The supreme court followed Pullen by further expanding the 
definition of appropriation in Alaska Action Center, Inc. v. Municipality of 
Anchorage138 when the court found that an initiative that would have 
retained the state’s ownership of an asset was nevertheless an 
appropriation because it interfered with the legislature’s discretion.139 
The proposed initiative would have dedicated 730 acres in Girdwood 
that was owned by the Municipality of Anchorage to be a public park, 
although the municipality was in the midst of developing the land into a 
private golf course.140 
The court analyzed the case under the second purpose of the 
prohibition.141 In comparing the initiative to that in McAlpine, the court 
 
 133. Id. at 63. The court does not address how this applies to voters who 
would not benefit from the legislation, nor does it define how the initiative 
would necessarily harm “vital government activities.” Id. 
 134. Id. at 63. 
 135. Id. at 64. The court’s focus on shortages is odd because the term does not 
appear anywhere in the initiative, which deals with how the harvest should be 
dealt with on all occasions. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 64 n.15. 
 138. 84 P.3d 989 (Alaska 2004). 
 139. Id. at 994. 
 140. Id. at 990. 
 141. Id. at 994. 
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emphasized that both initiatives designated specific amounts of 
property to be used for specific assets, even though the state retained 
ownership of the asset.142 Thus, by telling the legislature what it must do 
with a specific piece of property, the initiative “encroache[d] on the 
legislative branch’s exclusive control over the allocation of state assets 
among competing needs.”143 The court explained that “by limiting the 
mechanism for future change to another initiative process, the 
initiative’s dedication requirement necessarily intrudes on the 
legislature’s control over future designation.”144 However, this ignores 
the ability of the legislature to overturn initiatives after two years.145 
Thus, even assuming the court was correct that the initiative robs the 
legislature of its discretion, this alleged theft would only be for two 
years. 
E. Turning Back from the Edge? 
Although the court considerably expanded the prohibition in Pullen 
and Alaska Action Center, there may be reason to believe that the court 
has stepped back from an ever-expanding definition of “appropriation.” 
First, in Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage,146 the supreme court 
held that an initiative requiring Anchorage to sell the municipal power 
company for market value or to the highest bidder was an appropriation 
because, by usurping the legislature’s resource allocation role, the 
initiative interfered with the second purpose of the constitutional 
prohibition.147 In his concurrence, Justice Matthews attempted to “dispel 
any possible conclusion that the court’s broad interpretation of the term 
‘appropriations’ prohibits any substantive lawmaking by initiative that 
properly should be within the initiative power.”148 Matthews made clear 
that it was not the objective of the initiative that was the problem, but 
rather the requirement that Anchorage sell tangible property.149 
Accordingly, Matthews suggests that an initiative would be proper if it 
were to “directly prohibit the Municipality from, after a certain date, 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 144. Id. at 994–95. 
 145. See ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6. 
 146. 139 P.3d 1259 (Alaska 2006). 
 147. Id. at 1260–63. This was somewhat similar to the initiative in ACPAC, 
which required the municipality to sell the power company for one dollar. See 
Alaska Conservative Political Action Comm. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 745 
P.2d 936, 936 (Alaska 1987). 
 148. Staudenmaier, 139 P.3d at 1265 (Matthews, J., concurring). 
 149. Id. 
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selling or distributing electricity.”150 Matthews concluded by explaining 
that, “laws effecting substantial changes in policy can be made by 
initiative, but when they create surplus property, the disposition of such 
property is a matter for the representative lawmaking body.”151 
Next, the supreme court limited the definition of state asset in 
Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of Anchorage.152 The case 
concerned an initiative that would have required the municipality to 
issue taxicab permits to any qualified applicant who paid the 
administrative fee.153 The court held that the permits were not state 
assets because they did not authorize a holder to take a public resource 
and because the purpose of the permit was to regulate the industry for 
public safety.154 Justice Carpeneti dissented and argued that the majority 
mischaracterized the nature of the asset.155 Under Carpeneti’s analysis, 
the permit allows drivers to use the roads, a public resource, for private 
gain, and, since the administrative fee is well below the fair market 
value of a permit before the initiative, the initiative was essentially a 
giveaway.156 
IV. THE PROCEDURAL INTERACTION BETWEEN THE LEGISLATURE 
AND BALLOT INITIATIVES 
The general tendency of the Alaska Supreme Court has therefore 
been to adopt an increasingly broader view of what constitutes an 
appropriation. However, the supreme court has never truly taken into 
account the impact of sections 4 and 6 of article XI of the Alaska 
Constitution on the proper balance between the right to initiative and 
the appropriation prohibition.157 This is an error since all provisions of 
the constitution should be given effect. Additionally, these provisions 
are part of the general regulation of ballot initiatives and are necessary 
to fully understand the intention of the framers. Sections 4 and 6 are 
especially important in this regard because they show that the 
constitution envisions a dynamic relationship between citizens and the 
legislature in the ballot initiative process. The supreme court should 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1266. 
 152. 151 P.3d 418 (Alaska 2006). 
 153. Id. at 420. 
 154. Id. at 423–24. 
 155. Id. at 427 (Carpeneti, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. 
 157. In fact, the only time these provisions were ever mentioned was in Bailey, 
where the power of the legislature to overturn initiatives was mentioned briefly. 
See Bailey v. Warren, 595 P.2d 1, 7 (Alaska 1979). 
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therefore give full effect to these provisions when deciding whether an 
initiative is an appropriation. 
First, article XI, section 4 of the Alaska Constitution allows the 
legislature to preempt an initiative by passing a substantially similar bill 
before the election.158 Although it is not entirely clear when a legislative 
act is “substantially the same” as an initiative, it is clear that the 
legislature has the power to void a pending initiative through 
legislation. Thus, the constitution supports an important and often 
overlooked aspect of the initiative: the power to spur legislative action 
over issues that the legislature, for whatever reason, either ignores or 
has not chosen to address. This appears to be happening to a certain 
degree regarding Pebble Mine, since there has been action in both the 
House and Senate, although nothing definitive has been done.159 
Additionally, this power is especially useful for issues that have 
potentially broad support among the populace, but may cut against the 
grain of traditional partisan alliances. Pullen provides a good example 
since the initiative had the potential to create a coalition of traditionally 
conservative rural voters and anti-big business liberal voters.160 This 
coalition makes it possible that, if the issue had been allowed to go on 
the ballot, the legislature would have been prompted to reach some sort 
of consensus. 
Section 6 gives the Alaska Legislature the power to amend passed 
initiatives at any time and repeal initiatives after two years.161 The 
power to repeal allows the legislature to eliminate initiatives that prove 
to be unpopular or are simply bad policy after a relatively brief period of 
time. To be sure, this does not help in pure giveaways of state resources 
such as in Bailey,162 but it would allow the legislature to overturn the 
park in Alaska Action Center,163 as well as to overturn the restrictions in 
the Clean Water Initiatives164 if the legislature decides that large-scale 
mining in general, and Pebble in particular, are better uses of the 
resources. Thus, this two-year window acts as experimental time for the 
initiative and allows for proponents of the initiative to develop the 
 
 158. In relevant part, section 4 states that, “If, before the election, substantially 
the same measure has been enacted, the petition is void.” ALASKA CONST. art. XI, 
§ 4; see also ALASKA STAT. §15.45.210 (2008) (codifying provision). 
 159. See supra Part II.B (explaining ongoing legislative actions). 
 160. Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 55 (Alaska 1996). 
 161. See ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6. 
 162. See Bailey, 595 P.2d at 2. 
 163. See Alaska Action Ctr., Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 84 P.3d 989, 
991 (Alaska 2004). 
 164. See Review of 07WATR Initiative Application, Office of the Attorney 
General of Alaska, 2007 Alas. AG LEXIS 10, *1 (Alaska June 21, 2007). 
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necessary support to hold a legislative majority. Additionally, by giving 
the legislature the power to amend an initiative, the constitution 
acknowledges that initiatives may not be perfect when passed and may 
require legislative amendment. Although one could debate the 
definitions of “amending” and “repealing,” it is clear that the legislature 
maintains the power to change an initiative that needs to be modified 
and, after two years, the greater power to repeal an initiative that has 
lost political support.165 
Taken together, article XI, sections 4 and 6 demonstrate the 
complicated interaction between citizens and the legislature in the 
creation and maintenance of ballot initiatives. Citizens have the right to 
sponsor and pass initiatives, but an initiative may be superseded by the 
legislature either before or after its passage. This creates a system where 
legislative will acts as a strong democratic check on the impact of 
initiatives that either have only a passing popularity or are not ideal for 
reaching popular goals. The courts should be hesitant to interfere with 
this constitutionally created dynamic; rather, they should allow the 
design to play itself out in the public arena. By not allowing for such 
development, a court created regime will fail to properly balance the 
rights created in section 1, the prohibitions of section 7, and the citizen-
legislature interactions of sections 4 and 6. 
V.  DEVELOPING A PROPER TEST 
In any effective test, the Alaska Supreme Court must take into 
account the complex back-and-forth between the legislature and the 
citizens envisioned by the framers of the Alaska Constitution and 
enshrined in sections 4 and 6. In order to reach that goal, this Part will 
propose an amended test that keeps the same overall structure of the 
current test but has the following changes: first, the court should 
determine whether an initiative directly deals with a state asset; second, a 
giveaway should only be found when the voters themselves benefit from 
the initiative and not when a third-party is the beneficiary; third, the 
second purpose should only be implicated when the initiative robs the 
legislature of its discretion when it permanently disposes of the asset or 
involves some other irreversible action.166 
 
 165. See ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6. 
 166. This final reform was suggested in an email exchange between the 
Author and Geoffrey Parker. Email from Geoffrey Parker, Attorney, Law Office 
of Geoffrey Parker, to Tim Mullins, Executive Editor, Alaska Law Review (Apr. 
14, 2008). 
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A. The First Step: Defining a State Asset 
Under the current test, a court must decide whether an initiative 
deals with a state asset.167 This step has been broadly interpreted to 
include a variety of assets well beyond money, including land, salmon, 
and public utility companies.168 However, it raises one potential 
objection169 and two further considerations. The current test should be 
improved by determining that an appropriation only exists when an 
initiative directly deals with a state asset; further, courts should carefully 
consider how they define the state asset at issue since this will have 
major implications on step two. 
First, it is potentially objectionable to include non-monetary assets 
as state assets. Under this regime, the power of the initiative would 
increase and voters would be further empowered because any non-
monetary initiatives would be permitted. However, the court correctly 
decided against this approach. The state owns many assets beyond 
money and allowing groups to deplete the state treasury by robbing it of 
non-monetary assets seems to be incongruous with a restriction 
designed to limit that very power.170 Thus, the fear of “rash, 
discriminatory, and irresponsible” acts that animates the restriction is 
not limited to money.171 The constitution itself appears to envision a 
definition of appropriation that includes more than money since the 
restriction on appropriations comes directly before the restriction on 
revenues.172 
There are two further issues that must be considered. First, a test 
must define when an initiative actually deals with a state asset. This is 
important because it provides some limit to the reach of the restriction. 
For example, an extreme view may lead to the conclusion that anything 
tangentially dealing with a state asset, such as an initiative that would 
 
 167. See, e.g., Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of 
Anchorage, 151 P.3d 418, 422–23 (Alaska 2006). 
 168. Id. 
 169. There exists a secondary objection, which, while not disputing the 
importance of the requirement that a state asset be at issue, does raise the issue 
of whether it must necessarily be considered as a separate prong. That is, if we, 
for now, presuppose that the second step is correct, it may make more sense to 
consider whether the initiative deals with a state asset as merely an element of 
the test. Although this has some logical appeal, it is, in the end, not worth the 
disturbance it will cause because, either way, the court must decide whether 
there is a state asset involved at all; moreover, the current view allows for the 
court to kill initiatives without having to also go into the analysis of the second 
step. See, e.g., id. at 424. 
 170. See Bailey v. Warren, 595 P.2d 1, 8 (Alaska 1979). 
 171. Id. at 6–7. 
 172. See ALASKA CONST. art XI, § 7. 
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ban smoking in public parks, could possibly run afoul of the 
appropriation restriction. The court dealt with this issue squarely in 
Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform, where it refused to find that the taxi 
permits were state assets,173 implicitly rejecting the dissent’s argument 
that the initiatives dealt with the roads, an obvious state asset.174 At one 
level, the dissent is correct because roads are clearly a state asset. 
However, this argument is far too attenuated and indirect because the 
purpose of the initiative was unrelated to roads and only affected roads 
because taxis must drive on them. To prevent this argument from taking 
hold, the court should clarify the doctrine by requiring a challenged 
initiative to directly deal with a state asset. This would have the 
advantage of keeping intact a rather expansive definition of asset, but 
would also provide a useful limit to the reach of the prohibition. 
The test must also precisely define the asset.175 Although this issue 
evades any bright-line rules, two principles will be useful in guiding 
courts to reach the correct conclusion. First, in cases where the asset 
could be defined in one of several ways, the best approach would be to 
look to the underlying purposes and motivations behind the initiative. 
For example, in Pullen, the issue was how much salmon each interest 
could take in a given year;176 accordingly, the asset should be viewed as 
the salmon taken that year and not the overall salmon population. This 
has the advantage of preserving the motivating purpose behind the 
initiative and allowing for a more complete interaction between citizens 
and the legislature. 
In many cases, the relevant asset will be money, which can be 
defined in at least two different ways: the individual dollars spent or the 
general amount necessary to implement the initiative. To resolve this 
issue, the court should turn to the specificity of the initiative. Thus, if an 
initiative specifies the amount of money that must be spent each year, 
then the asset will be the dollars spent. On the other hand, initiatives 
that are more general policy statements and do not require a specific 
expenditure should be viewed in the latter way: as an implementation 
cost.177  
 
 173. See Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of Anchorage, 
151 P.3d 418, 424 (Alaska 2006). 
 174. See id. at 427 (Carpeneti, J., dissenting). 
 175. This issue is extremely important when analyzing whether the initiative 
actually robs the legislature of its discretion over the asset. See infra Part V.B.2. 
 176. Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 55 (Alaska 1996). 
 177. The further implications of this point will be discussed in Part V.B.2. 
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B. The Second Step: Interfering with the Dual Purposes of the 
Restriction 
The second step in the current test is ascertaining whether the 
initiative interferes with the dual purposes of the restriction on 
appropriations: the prevention of giveaways and the preservation of 
legislative discretion over state assets. Here, the court closely examines 
the initiative to determine what effect the initiative will have on the 
relationship between the legislature and the people. This part will make 
two key arguments. First, giveaways should only be found in instances 
where the voters themselves would benefit from the initiative and not 
where the beneficiary would be a third party. Second, the court should 
only find that an initiative unconstitutionally interferes with the 
legislature’s discretion over state assets when the initiative would 
permanently rob the legislature of that discretion.178 
1. Giveaways 
Under the current test, an initiative may not constitute a giveaway 
of state assets.179 This issue raises two questions: Should giveaways be 
considered appropriations? If so, when should they be found? 
First, giveaways should clearly be considered appropriations. The 
court in Bailey makes clear that the framers were very concerned about 
initiatives that could bankrupt the state by appealing to voters’ self-
interest.180 This is a major problem because these initiatives present the 
voter with a heavily weighted question: should they give themselves 
 
 178. A third point concerns whether the dual purpose test is actually required 
or whether the test would be better if there were merely one overarching 
purpose, i.e., that issues concerning the state treasury should be kept under the 
control of the legislature. This argument has some merit. For example, a 
giveaway clearly infringes upon the legislature’s discretion over that asset. In 
fact, in McAlpine, the court concluded that “the constitutional prohibition against 
appropriations by initiative applies to appropriations of state assets, regardless 
of whether the initiative would enact a give-away program or simply designate 
the use of the assets.” McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81, 89 (Alaska 
1988). Additionally, under the proposed test, the major difference is who is the 
beneficiary of the initiative: if the people benefit, there is a giveaway, but if a 
third party benefits, it is an interference with the legislature’s discretion. 
However, this step is not worth taking. First, it does not add anything to the way 
things are currently since courts would still look to see if there is a giveaway, as 
that would rob the legislature of its discretion. The change would thus be almost 
entirely cosmetic. Second, giveaways are a useful shorthand for initiatives that 
are clearly problematic because they go against the clear intent of the framers to 
prevent rash and discriminatory acts that appeal solely to voter self-interest. 
 179. See, e.g., City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Convention and Visitors Bureau, 
818 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Alaska 1991). 
 180. See Bailey v. Warren, 595 P.2d 1, 7–8 (Alaska 1979). 
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something for free or deny themselves that benefit so that the state can 
effectively govern? Perhaps at a philosophical level this presents 
something of a conundrum, but it may often lead to the rash decisions 
specifically condemned by the framers of the Alaska Constitution.181 
Moreover, banning giveaways promotes a healthy relationship between 
the legislature and the citizens by prohibiting voters from making policy 
choices that will materially benefit them. For example, if an initiative 
sponsor who wants to incentivize home-ownership could follow the 
lead in Bailey and just give away land, the legislature could not amend 
or repeal the initiative, and any attempts to preempt it would require 
convincing people that free land was bad for them. In contrast, with 
giveaways prohibited, the sponsor would have to craft an initiative that 
promotes this incentive in some other way that the legislature could 
preempt with another bill, amend after passage, or kill following a two-
year wait. 
Second, a giveaway should only be found in instances where the 
initiative promises a direct benefit to the voters. Once again, Bailey 
provides the clearest example of an initiative that meets this test 
because, by voting for the initiative, the voters would give themselves a 
rather large amount of land.182 These types of giveaways squarely 
implicate the framers’ fear that the initiative could lead to “rash, 
discriminatory, and irresponsible acts.” However, perhaps due to the 
relative clarity of its rule, Bailey is the only decision where the court was 
confronted by such an initiative. 
In contrast, the court has found giveaways in situations where, 
although a state asset was technically given away, the recipient of the 
asset was some entity other than the citizens themselves. This was the 
case in ACPAC, where the court held that an initiative that would have 
sold the public power company to a private company for the trivial price 
of one dollar was a giveaway.183 To be sure, this would have given away 
a state asset, but it does not appeal to the voters’ self-interest since 
voting for privatization benefits the receiving company. This is the 
primary justification for the rule and, without voter self-interest being 
present, makes finding that an initiative constitutes a giveaway more 
difficult. One argument in favor of keeping the rule could be that voters 
should not have this type of power and that giving away a state asset, 
even to a third party, is simply too reckless to be decided by the voters. 
 
 181. See id. at 6–7 (explaining that the framers’ motivation was to prevent 
“rash, discriminatory, and irresponsible acts”). 
 182. See id. at 8. 
 183. See Alaska Conservative Political Action Comm. v. Municipality of 
Anchorage, 745 P.2d 936, 938 (Alaska 1987). 
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However, this is distinct from the fears of reckless self-interest 
articulated by the framers of the Alaska Constitution.184 
Another problem with finding a giveaway in these instances is that 
it forces the court to make a quantitative judgment about when an 
initiative is a giveaway and when it is merely selling at a low price. In 
ACPAC, would there have been a giveaway if the selling price were $100 
or $1000? Fortunately, the supreme court essentially answered this 
question in Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage, which dealt with 
an initiative that would have required the state to sell the power 
company for a reasonable price.185 There, the court found that the 
initiative was an appropriation because it violated the second purpose 
by robbing the legislature of its discretion and requiring the state to take 
a specific action with a specific state asset.186 There are problems with 
the application of the second purpose, but in this case, that purpose 
points to a better solution to ACPAC-like initiatives than fitting them 
into the giveaway category. 
Left unresolved by this dichotomy are cases like Pullen, where the 
initiative confers a direct benefit to some, but not all, citizens.187 These 
initiatives, by only appealing to more limited types of self-interest, are 
better seen as policy statements; for example, in Pullen, the initiative 
seemed to ask citizens to express a general preference for small fishers 
over large commercial fishers, which is hardly a “rash, discriminatory, 
and irresponsible act” that would bankrupt the state treasury.188 
Therefore, initiatives such as this should not be considered giveaways. 
Although drawing this line may not always be easy, the court should 
always consider the scope of the alleged giveaway, both in terms of who 
it will benefit and how large that benefit will be. 
2. Interfering with the Legislature’s Discretion 
Under the current test, an appropriation exists if the initiative “sets 
aside a certain specified amount of money or property for a specific 
 
 184. See Bailey, 595 P.2d at 6–7. 
 185. Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage, 139 P.3d 1259, 1263 (Alaska 
2006). 
 186. See id. 
 187. The benefit would only have gone to people who fished salmon for 
personal, subsistence, or sport uses. See Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 63 (Alaska 
1996). Additionally, this alleged benefit may not even exist for a large percentage 
of fishers. For example, if the Board of Fisheries decides one year to grant that 
year’s permits primarily to subsistence fishers, none of the recreational or sport 
fishers would receive a personal benefit from the initiative. Thus, not every 
citizen would benefit from the initiative, and it would not be guaranteed that 
any benefit would even exist from year to year. 
 188. See Bailey, 595 P.2d at 7. 
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purpose or object in a manner that is executable, mandatory and 
reasonably definite with no further legislative action.”189 Similar to 
giveaways, this section also revolves around two primary questions: 
whether the second purpose should exist at all, and, if so, how far 
should it reach? This section will argue that the court was correct to 
include this purpose as part of the current test. However, it has been 
misapplied in at least one case because the court failed to properly 
account for the legislature’s power to amend or repeal an initiative after 
passage. Accordingly, this purpose should only be used to invalidate an 
initiative when the initiative would permanently remove the legislature’s 
discretion over a state asset. 
First, McAlpine was correct to include this purpose in the test to 
determine whether an initiative is an appropriation.190 The court in 
McAlpine turned to dictionaries and the use of “appropriation” in other 
legal contexts to conclude that “setting aside funds for a particular 
purpose” was an appropriation.191 Therefore, the court did not conduct 
the type of thorough constitutional analysis that occurred in Bailey.192 
This lack of analysis is somewhat troubling because by not inquiring 
into the purpose of the prohibition the court may have expanded the 
prohibition to a place it was never intended to go. Nothing in Bailey, 
however, precludes this holding. In fact, the speech by Delegate Taylor 
quoted in Bailey appears to support applying the restriction to instances 
that remove the legislature’s power to designate the use of state assets.193 
Finally, the court’s textual analysis is not without merit since the court 
correctly asserts that the typical type of legislative appropriation 
involves “committing certain public assets to a particular purpose.”194 
This purpose, however, must have a limit, or else it has the 
potential to swallow the entire rule because, at a certain level of 
abstraction, any initiative could interfere with the legislature’s 
discretion. For example, an initiative that would lower the state highway 
speed limit to fifty-five miles per hour appears to represent a clear 
policy preference for reducing traffic speed. However, it would also 
require significant expenditures to train police officers and to replace 
speed limit signs, thus robbing the legislature of the discretion to use 
that money for another purpose. Moreover, other initiatives that initially 
appear to be entirely concerned with policy could, on closer inspection, 
 
 189. Staudenmaier, 139 P.3d at 1262. 
 190. See McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81, 88 (Alaska 1988). 
 191. See id. 
 192. See Bailey, 595 P.2d at 6–8. 
 193. Id. at 7. 
 194. McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 88. 
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be viewed as appropriations. For example, the recently defeated Clean 
Elections Initiatives expressed a clear policy-goal of minimizing political 
corruption by providing public funding for state elections.195 However, 
this initiative also would have given hundreds of thousands of dollars to 
qualifying candidates,196 money which would otherwise have been 
spent according to the legislature’s discretion. These policy-based 
initiatives are precisely the type of initiatives that invoke the “basic 
authorities” of the people and would benefit most from the interaction 
between the legislature and the people envisioned by the Alaska 
Constitution. 
A limiting principle is therefore necessary to protect policy-based 
initiatives. The court has held that an appropriation will only be found 
when the initiative tells the legislature that it must take a specific action 
with a specific asset.197 This principle is what distinguished the two 
clauses in McAlpine, since the offending clause mandated that the 
legislature spend a specific amount of money, but the unoffending 
clause only required that the community college system be administered 
independently.198 This distinction is sensible and provides a useful check 
on initiatives that are so general that they are clear statements of policy, 
such as an initiative that would create an after-school program for all 
needy children. Additionally, the specificity requirement fits in clearly 
with the above discussion regarding how monetary assets should be 
defined.199 
However, the specificity requirement is insufficient because it fails 
to fully account for the constitutionally-created relationship between the 
legislature and the public. Alaska Action Center provides a clear example 
of this problem because, by requiring that the specific piece of land be 
dedicated as a state park,200 the initiative satisfies that specificity 
requirement. The decision is still problematic, however, because the 
state retains ownership of the land and the legislature still has the power 
to overturn the initiative in two years if it decides that the land could be 
put to better use, either as a golf course, as was initially intended, or as 
 
 195. See Alaskans for Clean Elections, Why Clean Elections, http:// 
www.alaskansforcleanelections.org/whyCleanElections.htm (last visited Nov. 
18, 2008). 
 196. See Alaskans for Clean Elections, How Clean Elections Work, 
http://www.alaskansforcleanelections.org/howCleanElectionsWork.htm (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2008). 
 197. McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 91. 
 198. Id. at 91–94. 
 199. See supra Part III.A. 
 200. See Alaska Action Ctr., Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 84 P.3d 989, 
994 (Alaska 2004). 
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something else. The initiative therefore would have allowed voters to 
express their policy decision that a piece of public land be kept as a park, 
but would not have permanently removed the asset from the 
legislature’s discretion. 
This situation could be fixed by adding one word to the current 
test: an appropriation should only be found when the initiative would 
require the legislature to use a specific asset for a specific purpose that 
permanently robs the legislature of its discretion over that asset. Under 
this test, an initiative that did not permanently strip the legislature of its 
discretion would be allowed to go through the entire process created by 
the constitution. The legislature would first have the chance to preempt 
the initiative by passing a substantially similar act and, since this would 
involve a decision that does not involve voter self-interest, the debate 
could focus more on the relative merits of the initiative. Then, after 
passage, the legislature could choose to amend the law or, after two 
years, repeal it. The supreme court’s decision in Alaska Action Center was 
therefore incorrect.201 
Two other decisions are worth discussing because they also present 
important issues. First, McAlpine confronts the issue of how the 
proposed test affects initiatives that deal with money. This issue is 
primarily resolved by applying the principle previously discussed 
regarding how to categorize money.202 Under this approach, McAlpine 
appears to be correctly decided. The second sentence was correctly 
invalidated203 because, by specifically defining the amount of money to 
be spent, the legislature was permanently robbed of its discretion over 
that money. On the other hand, the third sentence was correctly allowed 
to go to the voters204 because it merely required that the legislature 
create a separate community college department,205 leaving the 
legislature with discretion over that money because it could repeal the 
statute after two years. 
Pullen is also correctly decided under the proposed test, although it 
is a much closer call. The salmon at issue are the salmon from that year, 
and no later reversal by the legislature would ever get those salmon 
 
 201. On the other hand, Staudenmaier is clearly correct, since the initiative 
would have required the legislature to sell the power company for a determined 
price, thus severing the tie between the state and the asset permanently. 
Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage, 139 P.3d 1259, 1262–63 (Alaska 
2006). 
 202. See supra Part III.A. 
 203. McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 91. 
 204. Id. at 93. 
 205. Id. 
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back, short of raiding freezers and shelves.206 Additionally, the court is 
right that in times of shortage the state would be required to meet the 
five percent guarantee.207 Reading Pullen, however, one is left with an 
uneasy feeling that something is wrong with the court’s analysis even if 
the decision is technically correct. This result is partially because the 
initiative itself does not discuss shortages and the court’s preoccupation 
with this issue makes one wonder how the initiative would work when 
there is no shortage of salmon. It therefore appears that the court was 
stretching to find an appropriation in an initiative that, in most years, 
would not constitute one. Thus, Pullen, unlike Alaska Action Center, is not 
an incorrect decision, but should rather be considered the outer limits of 
the appropriation prohibition. The courts, however, should be wary of 
extending those limits any further. 
C. Conclusion 
With several minor adjustments, the current test could be vastly 
improved to better reflect the entire initiative process envisioned by the 
framers of the Alaska Constitution. The proposed test will, of course, not 
provide easy answers for every possible initiative because these issues 
are rarely cut and dry. Instead, the proposed test provides a usable 
framework that would assist judges and practitioners who confront this 
confusing area of the law, while simultaneously improving the 
constitutionally-created interaction between citizens and the legislature. 
VI. IS CLEAN WATER I AN APPROPRIATION? 
This Part will analyze whether Clean Water I would be considered 
an appropriation under both the current test and the proposed test 
described above. Under the current test, the court would have likely 
decided that Clean Water I would have been an appropriation; under 
the proposed test, however, it would not have been found to be an 
appropriation because, although the initiative would have severely 
restricted the legislature’s discretion in the short run, the legislature 
would ultimately retain control over the assets.208 
 
 206. See Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 63–64 (Alaska 1996). 
 207. Id. 
 208. This section does not include a discussion of the constitutionality of 
Clean Water III because, since the proposed test is more inclusive than the 
current test, all initiatives that qualify under the current tests will almost 
certainly also qualify under the proposed test. Additionally, Clean Water III, by 
merely proposing additional and not even particularly burdensome regulations, 
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A. Clean Water I Deals with a State Asset Under Either Test 
First, under both tests, Clean Water I deals with state assets. The 
initiative confronts fears of injury to people and salmon by regulating 
the amount of waste allowed to enter the water.209 The state assets in this 
situation are the water, because the initiative prevents pollution, and the 
salmon, because salmon are the beneficiaries of the initiative. As with 
Pullen, both of these are public goods and would therefore be considered 
state assets under the current test.210 The proposed test would also have 
little problem declaring the fish and water state assets because the 
initiative directly deals with the quality of the water and is for the direct 
benefit of the salmon. The distinction between both tests, therefore, is 
not particularly important to determine what state assets are involved 
here because of the initiative’s clarity. The two tests, however, might 
diverge in categorizing the specific state asset involved. The original test 
might view the individual salmon as benefitting from the initiative as 
the assets at issue, which might affect the permanence evaluation in the 
later part of the test. In contrast, the proposed test would make clear that 
the state asset affected is the salmon population in general because that 
is the sponsors’ apparent concern. 
B. Clean Water I Would Likely Not Be Considered a Giveaway 
Under Either Test 
Next, it is unlikely that Clean Water I would be considered a 
giveaway under either test, although there is a possibility that a radical 
reading of Pullen would allow for the original test to find a giveaway. 
The initiative is, at the very least, not the explicit type of giveaway 
condemned in Bailey because citizens are not being asked whether they 
want to give themselves a gift.211 What, though, do citizens get if they 
vote for the initiative? In a sense, they get the guarantee that the salmon 
industry will survive and are allowed to vent their frustration towards, 
and disapproval of, Pebble Mine.212 This situation is clearly not a 
 
does not implicate the larger issues regarding the use initiatives that animate 
Clean Water I. 
 209. See Review of 07WATR Initiative Application, Office of the Attorney 
General of Alaska, 2007 Alas. AG LEXIS 10, *1–4 (Alaska June 21, 2007). 
 210. See Pullen, 923 P.2d at 59. 
 211. Conversely, an initiative that, for example, dealt with this issue by giving 
everyone a percentage share in the income from the mine or the salmon industry 
would almost certainly be a giveaway. 
 212. The author is not attempting to argue that the opponents of Pebble Mine 
are correct in their scientific assertions but is rather hypothesizing what may 
cause a citizen to vote for the initiative. 
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giveaway because citizens are not gaining any material benefit; instead, 
they are acting from ideological or policy motivations, not rash self-
interest. 
The motivations of the salmon industry in supporting the initiative 
are more of an issue. As Pullen suggested, many people in Alaska are 
involved in salmon fishing, ranging from large-scale commercial fishers 
to occasional recreational fishers.213 In fact, the proponents of the 
initiatives emphasize just how important the salmon industry is to 
Alaska.214 Some people, especially those with considerable financial 
interests in the salmon industry, may support the initiative because, by 
securing the health of the salmon population, they may directly benefit 
from the initiative. The two tests might reach somewhat different results 
here. In Pullen, a giveaway was found because the initiative was said to 
appeal to the self-interest of non-commercial fishers.215 Though neither 
trial court did so, this logic could be further applied to the Clean Water 
Initiative because it does appeal to the self-interest of those involved in 
the salmon industry. 
This application would be wrong for the same reasons that Pullen’s 
finding of a giveaway was incorrect. First, not all Alaskans would 
benefit from this initiative because many Alaskans have no involvement 
with the salmon industry and many possible supporters are likely 
motivated by ideological and environmental reasons. Second, the benefit 
itself is far from certain because no one is guaranteed to gain anything 
since the initiative is neither giving away nor otherwise guaranteeing a 
certain amount of salmon. Additionally, opponents of the initiatives 
who stand to benefit from Pebble Mine will also vote out of their self-
interest, meaning that the initiative deals with competing material 
interests and is not a giveaway. 
C. The Analysis for the Second Purpose Varies Greatly Depending 
on the Test Used 
Finally, the analysis of Clean Water I under the second purpose 
clearly shows the significant differences between the two tests. Under 
the current test, interference with the legislature’s discretion occurs 
when an initiative “set[s] aside a certain specified amount of money or 
property for a specific purpose or object in a manner that is executable, 
 
 213. See Pullen, 923 P.2d at 63–64. 
 214. See, e.g., Parker et al., supra note 29, at 6–9. 
 215. See Pullen, 923 P.2d at 63. 
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mandatory and reasonably definite with no further legislative action,”216 
while under the proposed test, the standard is altered to only affect 
initiatives that permanently rob the legislature of its discretion. 
Under the current test, Clean Water I would likely be found to 
interfere with the legislature’s discretion because, by essentially being a 
ban, the initiative decides the distribution of state assets among the 
competing mining and salmon fishing interests. The legislature would 
therefore be robbed of any discretion regarding whether or not Pebble 
Mine should exist or what the conditions of its existence should be. 
Finding that the initiative interferes with the legislature’s discretion 
would expand the current doctrine because the initiative merely 
prevents one situation from occurring, rather than dictating exactly 
what should occur.217 However, the extension seems logical under the 
current test because of the clear interference with the legislature’s 
discretion regarding the mine, water, and salmon. Additionally, by not 
allowing mining, the initiative essentially requires that salmon fishing 
be the paramount use of Bristol Bay and therefore tells the legislature 
what it must do with an asset. Furthermore, there does not appear to be 
any instruction from the supreme court that would limit the reach of the 
prohibition in situations such as this one. 
On the other hand, under the proposed test, the initiative would 
not be considered an appropriation because the initiative does not 
permanently change anything. The initiative creates a new and more 
burdensome regulation on mines that will effectively prevent large-scale 
mines such as Pebble from operating. Though this is a significant act, the 
legislature retains the power to overturn the initiative in two years. 
Thus, the initiative serves merely as a check on the development of 
Pebble Mine, not a complete ban. Additionally, the legislature remains 
free to enact similar legislation that could assuage the concerns of the 
initiative’s supporters while still allowing the mine to be developed. 
This distinction is important because Clean Water I is a much stronger 
initiative than Clean Water III and more directly opposes the 
development of Pebble Mine, while Clean Water III merely expresses the 
desire that Pebble be developed in an environmentally safe manner. 
Though Clean Water III may have had a greater chance of gaining 
popular support due to its relative moderation, this is a decision for the 
 
 216. See Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage, 139 P.3d 1259, 1262 
(Alaska 2006). 
 217. This is the distinction raised by the Dillingham court which approved 
Clean Water I. See Holman v. Parnell, No. 3DI-07-56, 16–17 (Alaska Super. Ct. 
Oct. 12, 2007), available at http://www.ltgov.state.ak.us/PDFs/07WATR-
SummaryJudgment.pdf. 
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voters, not the courts, and the sponsors should have had the 
opportunity to present the clearest expression of their views. 
CONCLUSION 
The struggle over the Clean Water Initiatives has exposed a 
problem that goes even deeper than Pebble Mine and involves the 
power of Alaskans to enact meaningful and important legislation 
through the ballot initiative process. That this power should have limits 
is beyond debate. The contours of those limits, however, are extremely 
important in preserving the dynamic relationship between the citizenry 
and the legislature envisioned by the framers of the Alaska Constitution. 
In recent years, the supreme court has regrettably expanded the 
prohibition on appropriations in a way that disrupts this relationship 
and threatens to limit the use of the initiative process to confront the 
important issues facing Alaska. 
There is a way out of this problem that keeps intact much of the 
supreme court’s jurisprudence, but which, by finding appropriations 
only in situations that permanently rob the legislature of its discretion, 
fully acknowledges both the powers and limits of the ballot initiative. In 
its most recent opinions, the supreme court has acknowledged that its 
earlier opinions may be read too broadly in restricting initiatives. By 
adopting the proposed test, the court would continue upon this path 
and create an approach that allows for citizens to more fully express 
their constitutional right to sponsor ballot initiatives. Although this 
change may not affect Pebble Mine, there is hope that it will allow for 
greater citizen participation in the next major issue that confronts 
Alaskans. 
